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Abstract
The notion that foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) are comple-
mentary sources of capital is conventional among governments and international
cooperation agencies. This paper argues that the notion is incomplete. Within the
framework of an open economy Solow model we show that the theoretical relation-
ship between foreign aid and FDI is indeterminate. Aid may raise the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital by nancing complementary inputs, such as public infrastructure
projects and human capital investment. However, aid may also crowd out produc-
tive private investments if it comes in the shape of physical capital transfers. We
therefore turn to an empirical analysis of the relationship between FDI and disag-
gregated aid ows. Our results strongly support the hypotheses that aid invested in
complementary inputs draws in foreign capital while aid invested in physical capi-
tal crowds out FDI. The combined e¤ect of these two types of aid is small but on
average positive.
Keywords: Foreign aid, foreign direct investment (FDI), open economy Solow
model.
JEL classications: F21, F35, H40, O19.
1 Introduction
A salient point in the UN (2002) Monterrey Report of the International Conference on Fi-
nancing for Development is that o¢ cial development assistance (ODA), trade and foreign
direct investment (FDI) are three essential tools for development nancing. In particular:
We are grateful for comments from Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Heino Bohn Nielsen, Finn Tarp, Thomas
Rønde, Thomas Barnebeck Andersen and Nina Blöndal, as well as from participants at the DGPE 2007
workshop in Sandbjerg and the Nordic Conference in Development Economics 2007 in Copenhagen.
yDepartment of Economics, University of Copenhagen. Studiestræde 6, 1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark.
E-mail addresses: pablo.selaya@econ.ku.dk and eva.rytter.sunesen@econ.ku.dk.
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"ODA plays an essential role as a complement to other sources of nancing
for development, especially in those countries with the least capacity to at-
tract private direct investment. A central challenge, therefore, is to create the
necessary domestic and international conditions to facilitate direct investment
ows, conducive to achieving national development priorities, to developing
countries, particularly Africa, least developed countries, small island develop-
ing States, and landlocked developing countries, and also to countries with
economies in transition." (UN, 2002, p. 9).
However, the implicit presumption that ODA has a "catalysing" e¤ect on FDI, i.e.,
that aid and FDI are complements, is by no means evident. Kosack and Tobin (2006) argue
that aid and FDI are unrelated, because aid is mainly oriented to support the government
budget and nance investments in human capital, while FDI is a private sector decision
and relatively more connected to physical capital. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) nd that
the marginal product of capital (MPK) is roughly the same across countries, and one of
the implications is that increasing aid inows to developing countries will lower the MPK
in these economies and will tend to be fully o¤set by outows of other types of capital
investments (p. 540). If this is the case, aid and FDI are clearly closer to being substitutes
rather than being complements.
This paper provides a unied framework for assessing the relative merit of these dif-
ferent claims. We set up an open-economy Solow model with perfect capital mobility
that distinguishes between aid directed towards complementary factors of production and
aid invested in physical capital. The distinction serves to illustrate, on the one hand,
that aid invested in complementary factors increases MPK in the recipient country, which
tends to draw in additional foreign resources, and thus helps to sustain a higher level of
capital over time. For example, aid can ease important bottlenecks in poor countries by
nancing public infrastructure and human capital investments that would not have been
undertaken private actors (due to the free-riding problem in nancing public goods), nor
by public agents (because of the budgetary constraints that prevent aid-recipient govern-
ments from undertaking this type of investments). On the other hand, the model also
shows that foreign aid invested in physical capital directly competes with other types of
capital, and thus replaces investments that private actors would have undertaken anyway.
In this case, capital mobility and rate-of-return equalisation across countries will give rise
to a ight of other types of capital after an aid ow has been received.
The theoretical model provides a number of results and testable predictions. First, for
a given level of domestic saving, aid invested in physical capital crowds out other types of
foreign investments in physical capital, one for one. Second, aid invested in complementary
factors of production has an ambiguous e¤ect on FDI. The logic of the ambiguity is that,
while an increase in complementary factors increases MPK, the productivity increase also
raises income, domestic savings and domestic investments, which tends to lower MPK
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and thus to crowd out foreign investments. These two ndings suggest that the overall
impact of aid on FDI is ambiguous and that the composition of aid matters. Finally, the
relationship between complementary aid and FDI is unlikely to be linear, so scale e¤ects
from this type of aid should be taken into account.
We take the implications of our theoretical model to the data utilising a panel of 84
countries over the period 1970-2001. We nd a large and positive e¤ect of aid invested
in complementary factors, while aid invested in physical capital has a negative impact on
FDI. Although the combined impact of these two types of aid on FDI remains positive, our
results imply that more aid should be directed towards inputs complementary to physical
capital to optimise the return on aid. The results are robust to (1) a broader denition
of complementary aid than that adopted in our benchmark estimations, (2) to allowing
for imperfect capital mobility, and (3) to including other traditional FDI determinants.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the scarce empirical literature
on FDI and aid. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model of FDI and aid building on
an open economy Solow model with perfect capital mobility. Section 4 discusses relevant
econometric issues and presents the data. Section 5 shows the results, and Section 6 tests
their robustness. Section 7 sums up and discusses policy implications.
2 Literature Review
The relationship between aid and FDI is controversial and empirical results remain incon-
clusive. To our knowledge, only four papers explicitly analyse the relationship between
aid and FDI. Harms and Lutz (2006) and Karakaplan et al. (2005) analyse the question
for a broad sample of developing countries. Karakaplan et al. (2005) nd that aid has a
negative direct e¤ect on FDI and that both good governance and nancial market devel-
opment signicantly improve the impact of aid on subsequent ows of FDI. Harms and
Lutz (2006), on the other hand, nd that once they control for the regulatory burden in
the host country, aid works as a complement to FDI and, surprisingly, that the catalysing
e¤ect of foreign aid is stronger in countries that are characterised by an unfavourable
institutional environment.
The two case studies based on Japanese FDI and aid ows in Kimura and Todo (2007)
and Blaise (2005) also nd incongruent results. While Blaise (2005) nds positive e¤ects
of aid to infrastructure projects, Kimura and Todo (2007) nd no positive infrastructure
e¤ect, no negative rent-seeking e¤ect but a positive vanguard e¤ect (arising when foreign
aid from a particular donor country promotes FDI from the same country but not from
other countries).
This paper argues that the mixed results can be explained by the high level of ag-
gregation of the aid variable. While Karakaplan et al. (2005) include only overall ODA,
Harms and Lutz (2006) also distinguish between grants, technical cooperation grants, as
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well as bilateral and multilateral aid. However, it remains unclear why one would expect
foreign investors to react di¤erently to these sources of aid. Kimura and Todo (2007)
apply the idea of di¤erent types of aid, but construct their proxies relying only on data
for aid commitments and they only separate out aid to physical infrastructure.
3 A Theoretical Model of FDI and Aid
A general shortcoming in the empirical literature is the lack of consensus on the speci-
cation of the FDI relation, and none of the existing empirical papers on aid and FDI are
supported by a theoretical model. This paper closes this gap by proposing a Solow model
for a small open economy to model the main characteristics of the relationship between
aid and FDI.1
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function where GDP per capita, y, is given by
y = Ak, (1)
where k is the stock of physical capital per capita, K
L
,  is a constant and A denotes total
factor productivity.
We assume that the total ow of foreign aid, AID, can be split into aid invested in
complementary factors, AIDA, and aid invested in physical capital, AIDK , where AID =
AIDA+AIDK . AIDA by nature raises the marginal productivity of all production factors
that are complementary to physical capital.2 For example, infrastructure investments lead
to the interconnection of markets (Easterly and Levine, 1999), while investments in human
capital improve technology adoption. AIDK , on the other hand, enters the production
function only through its e¤ect on physical capital accumulation, and has no (augmenting)
e¤ect on total factor productivity.3
To model this explicitly, we rst assume that complementary aid has an augmenting
e¤ect on all production factors that are complementary to physical capital, and we thus
allow the ow of AIDA to increase the existing stock (A0) of A in the economy:
A = A0 + AIDA. (2)
Allowing complementary aid to have a direct impact on A is a shorthand for the idea that
AIDA has an augmenting e¤ect on any production factor other than k (e.g. human capital,
1One exception is Beladi and Oladi (2007) who analyse the question in a general equilibrium setting
where all foreign aid is used to nance public goods.
2The argument of complementarity between public and private investment is generalised by Clar-
ida (1993) and Chatterjee et al. (2003). Reinikka and Svensson (2002) nd empirical support for the
importance of complementary public capital for foreign investors.
3We thus allow part of foreign aid to be productivity enhancing while FDI brings no spillovers. In
reality, all capital transfers might contain some knowledge transfer but the assumption is made to keep
the model simple and tractable.
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public investments, new technology, etc.) and, thus, it is able to increase ultimately
the MPK.
Second, we assume an open economy.4 Accordingly, in per capita terms, capital equip-
ment can be nanced by (i) domestic savings (S = sy, where s is a given savings rate),
(ii) foreign direct investments (fdi) and (iii) the inow of aid invested in physical capital
(aidK). Then capital accumulation per capita is given by
_k = sy + fdi+ aidK   (n+ )k, (3)
where n is the population growth rate and  is a xed depreciation rate.
With perfect capital mobility, the world real rate of return, rw, pins down at any point
in time the net return to capital (MPK   ), and thus
rw = MPK   = Ak 1   . (4)
According to (4), the steady state level of k at any point in time is given by
k =

A
r
 1
1 
, (5)
where r is dened as a gross world real rate of return, rw + .
Rewriting (3) taking (5) as given, the ow of FDI per capita is determined as the
residual
fdi =  aidK   sy + (n+ )k, (6)
where y = Ak.
At a rst glance, (6) seems to support the Caselli and Feyrer (2007) conjecture that
aid and FDI are substitutes: for a given level of domestic savings, equalisation between
MPK and r requires an increase in foreign aid to be accommodated by a proportional
reduction in FDI:
@fdi
@aidK
=  1. (7)
However, this nding only holds for aid invested in physical capital. The e¤ect of
complementary aid, on the other hand, has two components:
@fdi
@aidA
=  s @y

@aidA
+ (n+ )
@k
@aidA
. (8)
First, since
s
@y
@aidA
= s
@ (Ak)
@aidA
= s

Lk + Ak 1
@k
@aidA

> 0, (9)
4In line with Sørensen and Witta-Jacobsen (2006, Ch. 4) and Turnovsky (2000).
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complementary aid has a positive e¤ect on domestic savings and thus on domestically
nanced capital investments. This result comes from the fact that aidA shifts the pro-
duction function thereby raising the steady state levels of income and domestic savings.
Given the assumption of MPK equalisation in (4), the corresponding increase in domesti-
cally nanced investments causes a proportional reduction in the need for FDI of the size
 s @y
@aidA
.
Also, since
@k
@aidA
=
@
@aidA
 
A
r
 1
1 
!
=
1
1  

A
r
 
1  L
r
> 0, (10)
we see that complementary aid has a positive e¤ect on the steady state capital stock.
This nding is based on the augmenting e¤ect of aidA, which raises MPK and thus allows
the recipient country to increase its capital stock without experiencing a counterbalancing
capital ight. That is, for a xed s, aid-nanced investments in complementary factors
allow a sustainable increase in FDI equal to (n+ ) @k

@aidA
.
This model holds then several implications that should be taken into account when
assessing the empirical relationship between aid and FDI. First, the e¤ect of total aid on
FDI is ambiguous:
@fdi
@aid
=
@fdi
@aidK
+
@fdi
@aidA
=  1  s @y

@aidA
+ (n+ )
@k
@aidA
? 0, (11)
because we expect aid to production sectors to have a negative e¤ect on FDI, but the
e¤ect of complementary aid is indeterminate. Second, from equations (9) and (10), since
the marginal e¤ect of complementary aid on FDI includes the level of aid itself, the
relationship between complementary aid and FDI is not linear. In particular, there are
scale e¤ects from complementary aid that should be taken into account. Since  s @y
@aidA
and (n+ ) @k

@aidA
work in opposite directions, the sign of the second order e¤ects will also
be indeterminate and will need to be assessed empirically. Third, the model stresses the
need to take all sources of capital into account, and it is therefore essential to include
domestic savings as an additional explanatory variable in the empirical FDI analysis. To
our knowledge, this has not been done before.
4 Econometric Issues
In a panel setting, the econometric interpretation of the aid-FDI relationship is
fdiit = 0 + 1A
0
it + 2nit + 3Sit + 4aid
K
it + 5aid
A
it + 6
 
aidAit
2
+ uit, (12)
6
where fdiit is FDI per capita in country i during period t, A0it is the overall productivity
level at the beginning of period t, nit is population growth, Sit is domestic savings per
capita, aidKit is aid invested in physical capital, and aid
A
it is aid invested in complemen-
tary factors. The square of aidAit is included in (12) to control for the scale e¤ects of
complementary aid.
We expect 1 to be positive since a high productivity level gives a high steady state
level of capital, 2 should be positive since a fast growing population lowers the per capita
capital stock and thus allows for an increase in FDI per capita, and 3 should be negative
since high domestic saving lowers the need for foreign capital. From equation (7) we know
that aidK crowds out foreign investments one-to-one, 4 =  1, whereas the e¤ect of aidA
(5 and 6) is indeterminate. Since data on total productivity is unavailable, the next
section will discuss the strategy used to identify A0it empirically.
4.1 Productivity
Since data on the initial productivity level (A0it) is unavailable, we need to nd valid
proxies. In the rst case, we use pooled OLS (POLS) and estimate
fdiit = t + 0 + 1nit + 2Sit + 3aid
K
it + 4aid
A
it + 5
 
aidAit
2
+ uit, (13)
where t is a time-specic constant that captures common productivity shocks at time t.
However, not all countries start out with the same initial conditions and we thus allow also
for cross sectional di¤erences in productivity by including time-invariant country-specic
xed e¤ects, i,
fdiit = t + i + 0 + 1nit + 2Sit + 3aid
K
it + 4aid
A
it + 5
 
aidAit
2
+ uit. (14)
This equation can be estimated consistently and e¢ ciently with a xed e¤ects model
(FE). However, if productivity evolves unequally across countries over time, regression
(14) leaves out important information. We therefore extend the list of variables to include
a lagged dependent variable, which captures time-moving country-specic factors as well
as agglomeration e¤ects,
fdiit = t+i+0+1fdiit 1+2nit+3Sit+4aid
K
it +5aid
A
it+6
 
aidAit
2
+uit. (15)
Equation (15) can be estimated consistently and e¢ ciently using the Arellano and
Bond (1991) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. It is important to
notice that including a lagged dependent variable also reduces the need to control for
other FDI determinants. All estimators use standard errors that are robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity as well as intra-group correlation (clustering).
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4.2 Endogeneity
We need to consider the possible endogeneity of aid in estimating the above equations,
since all estimators are consistent only if all explanatory variables are exogenous. Aid
would be endogenous, for example, if donors systematically disburse more resources to
those countries that are neglected by private foreign investors (Harms and Lutz, 2006).
We therefore estimate (13)(15) following the instrumentation strategy in Hansen and
Tarp (2000, 2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) and Dalgaard et al. (2004).
The rst set of instruments accounts for donorsoverall preference for granting more
aid to countries with smaller populations and lower levels of income per capita and thus
includes (lagged) interactions between levels of aid and (i) the size of population and (ii)
the initial level of GDP per capita in the recipient country. We also include the lagged
level of aid to account for persistency in other determinants of aid as well as a dummy
variable for African countries in the CFA franc zone to capture particular donorsstrategic
interests.
Tests conrm the validity of our instruments, and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test nds
that the aid variables should be treated as endogenous in the FDI relation. All the results
reported in the next section are therefore based on Instrumental Variables (IV) methods.
4.3 Data
The dependent variable, fdiit, is net FDI inows in constant US dollars from the UNCTAD
Foreign Direct Investment database, divided by the population to control for country size.
The main explanatory variables are the population growth rate and savings per capita
from the WDI (2005).
The aid variables are based on total net ows of o¢ cial aid disbursements reported in
the OECD/DAC database. Since data on sectoral disbursements are available only after
1990, the measure of per capita aid ows to sector s, aidsit, is constructed using sectoral
commitments as a proxy for sectoral disbursements. In particular, we follow Clemens
et al. (2004) and Thiele et al. (2006) and assume that the proportion of aid actually
disbursed to sector s is equal to the proportion of aid committed to sector s, and hence
that
aidsit 
commitsitP
s commit
s
it
P
s aid
s
it, (16)
where commitsit is the amount of ODA commitments to sector s. Approximating sectoral
disbursements with sectoral commitments may cause some concerns due to di¤erences in
denitions and statistical record (see Clemens et al., 2004, for more details). However,
according to Odedokun (2003) and Clemens et al. (2004) this problem is likely to be
small since disbursements and commitments (both on the aggregate and sectoral levels)
are highly correlated. Also, annual discrepancies are likely to be larger than averages,
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and we thus average the data over ve-year intervals.
Aid is decomposed into two broad categories according to its purpose of investment:
 Aid invested in complementary inputs: aid oriented to social infrastructure (such
as education, health, and water supply projects) and economic infrastructure (such
as energy, transportation and communications projects).
 Aid invested in physical capital: contributions to directly productive sectors (such
as agriculture, manufacturing, trade, banking and tourism projects).
These two aid categories capture the main characteristics of aidA and aidK : aid in-
vested in complementary factors is intended to generate positive spillover e¤ects (public
goods, inputs complementary to physical capital) whereas aid invested in physical capi-
tal has a more narrow purpose and could more easily have been undertaken by private
investors. Other sectoral aid categories (like multisector support, programme assistance,
debt reorganisation, emergency assistance and unallocated types of aid) are excluded
from the analysis since they are primarily oriented to provide scal budget support in the
recipient country.5
5 Results
Figure 1 in Appendix shows the partial correlation between FDI and aid invested in
physical capital. While there seems to be a negative relationship between the two vari-
ables, it is di¢ cult to assess if there is full crowding out from the downwards sloping line
(that is, to assess if the slope is  1). Figure 2 in Appendix depicts the partial correla-
tion between FDI and aid invested in complementary goods. The gure clearly indicates
that the two variables are positively correlated and that the relationship might not be
linear. However, the exact predictions from the theoretical model can only be tested
in a more comprehensive framework where country-specic characteristics capture the
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity clearly prevalent in the gures.
Results from estimating equations (13)(15) for a sample of 84 countries using ve-
year intervals are reported in Table 1. Independently of the chosen estimator, our results
strongly support the notion that aid invested in complementary factors has a catalysing
e¤ect on FDI. This means that the short-run replacement e¤ect of aidA on FDI is out-
weighed by the positive e¤ect that complementary aid has on the long-run levels of income
and capital per capita. A Hausman test conrms the signicance of xed e¤ects, and the
highly signicant lagged dependent variable suggests that we should rely on the consistent
5Section 6 includes a test for robusteness of the results with respect to the denition of complementary
aid, and a note about the changes in the results when variables possibly correlated with aidA are included
in the regressions.
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Table 1: FDI and Foreign Aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS FE GMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-SYS
aidK  0:59  1:56  0:77  0:94  0:88
[0:8] [0:3] [0:2] [0:2] [0:2]
aidA 1:67
 1:71 1:34 1:24 1:07
[0:5] [0:2] [0:2] [0:2] [0:2]
aidA, squared  0:0028  0:0012  0:0015  0:0015  0:0013
[0:0006] [0:0007] [0:0002] [0:0002] [0:0002]
Savings, sy 29:7  32:3 1:11 20:5  20:2
[16] [24] [23] [7:8] [17]
Pop. growth, n  7:26  0:97 1:05  3:7  2:19
[3:5] [1:4] [1:6] [2:5] [1:8]
fdit 1 0:045 0:40 0:38
[0:1] [0:09] [0:1]
GDP per capita 13:7
[4:1]
Constant 12:9 : : 5:04 1:14
[14] : : [8:5] [6:0]
Observations 289 277 217 289 289
R2 0:11 0:08 : : :
N. countries 84 72 76 84 84
Model specication tests:
Hansen-Sargan overid. (0:21) (0:88) (0:15) (0:34) (0:79)
Underid. (0:0028) (0:0) : : :
Cragg-Donald F (0:0021) (0:0) : : :
Anderson F joint sig F (0:0) (0:0) : : :
DWH p (0:071) (0:0026) : : :
AR(1) : : (0:00) (0:21) (0:75)
AR(2) : : (0:77) : :
Hypothesis tests on marginal e¤ects evaluated at the median:
ME of aidK =  1 0:41  0:56 0:23 0:06 0:12
[0:83] [0:30] [0:19] [0:25] [0:21]
ME of aid > 0 0:96 0:10 0:50 0:24 0:13
[0:52] [0:37] [0:13] [0:09] [0:07]
ME of aidA > 0 1:55 1:66 1:27 1:18 1:02
[0:51] [0:18] [0:16] [0:22] [0:22]
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets, p-values
in parentheses. The dependent variable is FDI per capita. All regressions include time
dummies. Aid variables are instrumented with own lags, interactions with GDP per
capita, log(pop) and a FRZ dummy.
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and e¢ cient Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator in our further analysis. When
the time series are persistent, the rst-di¤erence GMM (GMM-DIF) estimator is poorly
behaved since under such conditions lagged levels of the variables are only weak instru-
ments for subsequent rst-di¤erences. We therefore rely on the system GMM (GMM-SYS)
estimator suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). All
variables are treated as endogenous, which means that instruments should be lagged two
periods or more to be valid.
The results in column (4) in Table 1 show that, for a given domestic savings rate, one
aid dollar invested in complementary factors draws in 1.24 dollars of FDI, both in per
capita terms. The square of complementary aid is negative and signicant, suggesting
that the "savings" e¤ect described in equation (9) dominates for su¢ ciently high levels of
aidA. Evaluated at the median of the sample, our results indicate that the marginal e¤ect
of aidA on fdi is 1.18, and a Wald test conrms it to be signicantly positive. Having
specied a dynamic model, we can calculate the long run e¤ect of aidA by assuming a
that the level of FDI per capita is the same in every period. Evaluating at the median,
we nd that one additional aid dollar per capita invested in complementary factors draws
in 1.97 (1.18/0.6) dollars of FDI per capita in the long run. We conclude from this that
aidA generates important short run as well as long run benets for foreign investors.
The results also conrm the crowding out e¤ect of aid invested in physical capital, since
one aid dollar per capita invested in physical capital replaces 0.94 dollars of fdi, which
accumulate to 1.57 dollars in the long run (0.94/0.6).
The e¤ect of population growth is insignicant throughout the analysis. But, con-
trary to the prediction from our model, we nd a positive rather than a negative e¤ect of
domestic savings on fdi. A plausible explanation is that foreign investors look explicitly
at data on national savings when making their investment decisions and interpret a high
s as a signal of sustained growth history and good economic prospects.6 To adjust for
this positive externality we include GDP per capita in column (5). Adjusting for the pur-
chasing power of the population leaves savings insignicant and negative, which suggest
that once we correct for the positive signalling e¤ect of a high saving rate, domestic and
foreign capital are substitutes as suggested by the theoretical model.
Finally, we perform some tests of hypothesis and present the results at the bottom of
the Table. We test the Caselli and Feyrer (2007) conjecture that aid invested in physical
capital replaces FDI one for one. The Wald tests show that we cannot reject its validity in
most of the cases. We also nd that the combined e¤ect of aidA and aidK is signicantly
positive and between 0.21 and 0.24 (evaluated at the median of the sample), which implies
that the substitution e¤ect of aidK is more than outweighed by the positive e¤ects of aidA
6This is in line with evidence showing that the households with the highest lifetime incomes are the
ones with highest lifetime saving rates (Carroll, 2000), and that higher growth rates lead to higher savings
rates (Carroll, Overland and Weil, 2000; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 2000).
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on fdi in a typical country. If the marginal e¤ects are evaluated at the mean instead of
the median, our conclusions remain the same.
6 Robustness
In light of the important policy implications arising from our results, it is necessary
to ensure that these results are robust to correcting for possible misspecications in the
empirical relationship between FDI and aid. We carry out three basic checks for robustness
of our empirical ndings.
6.1 Technical Assistance
The grouping of aid variables could be questioned. In particular, aid in this paper does not
include Technical Cooperation Grants (TCGs), which contribute to development primarily
through education and training. Since TCGs consist of activities involving the supply
of human resources or actions targeted on human resources (education, training, and
advice) one could easily argue that TCGs would have the same impact as aid invested in
complementary factors. In the Appendix (Table 4) we therefore replicate the specications
from Table 1 using an extended denition of aidA that includes also TCGs from the OECD
database. Although there is a slight drop in the size of the coe¢ cients, the results from
Table 1 carry over.
6.2 Imperfect Capital Mobility
If mobility of capital is imperfect, MPK should be allowed to deviate from the gross world
interest rate by a risk-premium, , that reects idiosyncratic country characteristics. In
this case, the rst-order condition in (4) should read
r +  = MPK, (17)
and the capital stock in (5) should be redened accordingly:
k =

A
r + 
 1
1 
. (18)
While this renders the e¤ect of aid invested in physical capital unchanged, the e¤ect
of complementary aid becomes somewhat more complicated. The risk premium impact
FDI directly through (18) but, given that
@k
@aidA
=
@
@aidA
 
A
r + 
 1
1 
!
=
1
1  

A
r + 
 
1  L
r + 
, (19)
12
the marginal e¤ect of aidA will also depend on the risk premium and thus on country-
specic characteristics. To capture this econometrically, we include the risk premium level
and its interaction with aidA, and estimate
fdiit = t + i + 0 + 1nit + 2Sit + 3aid
K
it + 4aid
A
it + 5
 
aidAit
2
(20)
+6it + 7
 
aidAit  it

+ uit.
6 and 7 are expected to be negative because higher risk reduces country is attrac-
tiveness as an investment location.
To capture the risk premium we include the overall International Country Risk Guide
rating as well as its three subcategories of risk: political, nancial and economic.7 All
risk variables are treated as endogenous. In general, lower political risk is associated with
higher levels of overall accountability, stability and institutional quality in the political
process. In particular, from the ICRG rankings, political risk is lower (1) the higher
the government stability, (2) the better the socioeconomic conditions and the investment
prole, (3) the lower the number of internal conicts, external conicts and political
corruption, (4) the lower the military is involved in politics, (5) the lower the religious
and the ethnic tensions, (6) the higher the prevalence of law and order, and (7) the
larger the degrees of democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality. Results from
estimating (20) including these political risk measures are reported in Table 2.8
The political risk variable enters only signicantly in four cases. Relative absence of
external conict, low level of religious tensions and a high level of democratic account-
ability suggest all a lower risk premium and tend to attract foreign investors. However,
the prevalence of law and order shows a negative impact on FDI inows (signicant only
at the 10% level, though). This counter intuitive result might be due to the fact that we
have already accounted for domestic savings, which will be highly correlated with this risk
variable: countries characterised by law and order tend to have higher domestic saving.
The interactions between complementary aid and the political risk indicator are more
often signicant, and the results suggest that government stability, favourable socioeco-
nomic conditions, an attractive investment prole, low military interference in politics
and better bureaucratic quality are all supportive of a high steady-state level of capital.
Although the results shows a negative impact of the interaction between aidA and the
index for low degree of religious tensions, the net marginal e¤ect on FDI remains positive.
Table 3 presents similar estimations taking into account di¤erent economic and nan-
cial risk measures. The economic risk variables reect the macroeconomic situation and
7In order to detect signicant e¤ects of aid on FDI, Karakaplan et al. (2005) and Harms and Lutz
(2006) use aid interacted with the Kaufmann et al. (2005) governance indicators to capture di¤erences
in government e¤ectiveness.
8For the results in Table 2, a high value of the di¤erent political-risk measures is associated a low
overall political risk, and hence, a high value of the di¤erent risk measures should have a positive e¤ect
on fdi.
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the economic advancement of the host country: GDP per capita, real GDP growth, ina-
tion, the budget balance as a share of GDP and the current account as a share of GDP.
The nancial risk variables assess a countrys ability to nance its o¢ cial, commercial
and trade debt obligations: external debt as a share of GDP, debt service as a share of
exports, the current account as a share of export, international liquidity as months of
import cover and exchange rate stability (calculated here as the annual change in the
real exchange rate).9 Results in Table 3 keep our overall conclusions unchanged. It is
interesting to note, however, that the political risk variables seem to be more important
to foreign investors than the economic and nancial risk variables.
6.3 Omitted Variables
Tables 2 and 3 show a positive impact from the savings rate on fdi. We adjust for this
in Tables 5 and 6 including the level of GDP per capita in the regressions. As in Table 1,
the e¤ect of savings disappears and it is captured by the level of GDP per capita, which
supports our results previously suggesting the existence of positive externalities from s to
fdi.
However, it is important to notice that once we adjust for the risk of investing abroad
by including various proxies for the risk premium, population growth turns out to have
a signicantly negative impact on fdi in both Tables 2 and 3. One explanation might
be that a fast growing population is attractive for the e¢ ciency-seeking investor but that
the quality of the abundant labour in some countries might be too poor to attract foreign
investors. In this case, a fast growing population might instead cause social tensions and
excessive burdens on the public system, which will tend to scare away foreign investors
rather than draw in more investments.10 We therefore add the primary school enrolment
rate from the World Development Indicators (2005) in Tables 5 and 6, to take the quality
of the labour force and the level of development into account.11 In many cases, the
adjustment for the quality of the labour force means that population growth no longer
enters signicant and in the remaining cases it reduces the size of the initially negative
e¤ect on fdi. It is interesting noticing that the adjustment for the level of human capital
reduces the size of the e¤ect of aidA on fdi. This means that the aidA variable is picking
up the information that we intend, and thus substantiates our choice and denition of
di¤erent types of aid.
9Similar to the case of the political risk indexes, all these di¤erent measures reect lower overall levels
of economic and nancial risk.
10This is in line with Mankiw, Romer and Weils (1992) point that a higher population growth rate
implies lower per capita human capital levels and thus lower MPK levels. This will have a negative
impact on FDI.
11The data on school enrolment is highly unbalanced, so we interpolated within countries to ll in
gaps, and extended the series with the rst and the last values to complete the extremes. The correlation
between the original and the transformed series is above 0.98 in both cases.
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Finally, while our empirical specication includes both variables predicted by our
theoretical model as well as a rich specication of idiosyncratic country characteristics,
there might be additional variables that play a role in the allocation choice of foreign
investors. To test for this, further regressions included measures of market potential
(regional dummies, urban population and rural population), factor market characteristics
(size of the labour force, average years of schooling) and market access (openness, number
of vehicles, transportation network density, telephone lines and rail lines). None of them
turned out signicant or to have a qualitative impact on our results. These results are
available upon request.
7 Conclusion
Due to its potential to transfer knowledge and technology, create jobs, boost overall
productivity, and enhance competitiveness and entrepreneurship, attracting FDI to de-
veloping countries is essential to contribute to economic growth, development and poverty
reduction. Given the emphasis on using ODA as a vehicle for creating a private sector
enabling environment, the question of whether or not aid ows induce signicantly more
FDI inows becomes an important and relevant question not only on its own right but
also as an essential element in the aid e¤ectiveness debate.
The results strongly support the hypotheses that aid invested in inputs complementary
to physical capital draws in foreign capital, while aid directly invested in physical capital
crowds out private foreign investments. While the impact of the two types of aid together
is positive, an important policy implication is that the composition of foreign aid matters
and that more aid should be directed towards complementary inputs. Such investments
improve the absorption capacity of the recipient country and increase MPK in the host
country, which allows it to accumulate more foreign capital without experiencing a drop
in domestic investments or a ight of foreign capital.
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Figure 1: FDI and Aid to Physical Capital (aidK)
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Figure 2: FDI and Aid to Complementary Factors (aidA)
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Table 4: FDI and Foreign Aid  Alternative Denition of aidA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
POLS FE GMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-SYS
aidK  0:29  1:47  0:71  0:75  0:74
[0:8] [0:2] [0:2] [0:3] [0:2]
aid yA 1:09
 1:65 1:33 0:97 0:87
[0:4] [0:2] [0:2] [0:2] [0:2]
aid yA, squared  0:0020  0:0012  0:0015  0:0012  0:0011
[0:0004] [0:0006] [0:0002] [0:0002] [0:0002]
Savings, sy 38:5  25:8 6:62 26:5  20:3
[17] [22] [20] [10] [18]
Pop. growth, n  8:91  1:7 0:52  5:50  3:18
[4:1] [1:4] [1:4] [3:2] [2:3]
fdit 1 0:018 0:37 0:36
[0:1] [0:1] [0:1]
GDP per capita 15:4
[4:3]
Constant 18:8 : : 5:73  0:99
[13] : : [10] [6:7]
Observations 289 277 217 289 289
R2 0:11 0:08 : : :
N. countries 84 72 76 84 84
Model specication tests:
Hansen-Sargan overid. (0:12) (0:53) (0:11) (0:30) (0:86)
Underid. (0:0017) (0:0) : : :
Cragg-Donald F (0:0013) (0:0) : : :
Anderson F joint sig F (0:0) (0:0) : : :
DWH p (0:17) (0:0018) : : :
AR(1) : : (0:00) (0:12) (0:54)
AR(2) : : (0:69) : :
Hypothesis tests on marginal e¤ects evaluated at the median:
ME of aidK =  1 0:71  0:47 0:29 0:25 0:26
[0:80] [0:24] [0:19] [0:28] [0:22]
ME of aid > 0 0:71 0:13 0:56 0:17 0:07
[0:57] [0:33] [0:15] [0:11] [0:08]
ME of aid yA > 0 1:00
 1:60 1:26 0:92 0:82
[0:35] [0:14] [0:16] [0:23] [0:21]
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in
parentheses. The dependent variable is FDI per capita. All regressions include time
dummies. Aid variables are instrumented with own lags, interactions with GDP per capita,
log(pop) and a FRZ dummy. aid yA is dened as aidA+ technical cooperation grants.
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Table 7: Partial Correlations  Main Variables
fdi aidK aidA aid
y
A n sy
fdi 1
aidK  0:24 1
aidA  0:16 0:79 1
aid yA  0:15 0:78 0:99 1
n  0:24 0:03  0:05  0:02 1
sy 0:35 0:12 0:19 0:17  0:18 1
Table 8: Partial Correlations  Economic Risk Measures
GDP per GDP Ination Budget Curr. Acc.
capita growth rate balance balance
GDP per capita 1
GDP growth  0:08 1
Ination rate 0:14  0:23 1
Budget balance 0:12 0:18  0:20 1
Curr. Acc. balance 0:22 0:19  0:24 0:25 1
Table 9: Partial Correlations  Financial Risk Measures
Foreign For. debt Curr. Acc. Reserves to Exch. R.
debt service to exports imp. months stab.
Foreign debt 1
For. debt service 0:14 1
Curr. Acc. to exports  0:56  0:17 1
Reserves to imp. months  0:24  0:05 0:22 1
Exch. R. stab. 0:30 0:28  0:26  0:01 1
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Table 11: Summary Statistics
Obs Median Mean Std. dev. Min. Max
Main variables:
fdi 289 9:8 27:2 64:1  384:9 547:0
aidK 289 6:8 15:9 41:9  18:7 442:1
aidA 289 21:6 40:1 79:6  12:2 914:4
aid yA 287 32:5 50:3 82:2  7:0 926:0
n 289 2:3 2:2 1:0  5:1 7:0
sy 289 0:1 0:3 0:5  0:4 3:2
Political risk measures:
ICRG index 233 60:3 60:1 10:3 27:6 80:6
Govt. stab. 232 8:0 7:6 2:2 2:3 12:0
Socio-ec. condit. 232 5:0 4:9 1:5 1 9
Investm. prole 232 6:1 6:3 1:8 1:2 11
Internal conict 232 8:2 7:8 2:4 0:4 12:0
External conict 232 9:8 9:4 2:0 2:3 12:0
Political corrup. 232 3:0 2:8 0:9 0 5
Military in politics 232 3:0 3:1 1:5 0 6
Religious tensions 232 5:0 4:3 1:4 0 6
Law and Order 232 3:0 3:2 1:1 1 6
Ethnic tensions 232 4:0 3:9 1:4 0 6
Democ. account. 232 3:3 3:3 1:2 0 6
Bureauc. quality 232 2:0 1:7 0:9 0 3:5
Economic risk measures:
GDP per capita 289 1:1 1:5 1:7 0:1 9:1
GDP growth 289 3:7 3:7 3:1  11:5 15:7
Ination rate 280 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:0 2:8
Budget balance 242 0:0 0:0 0:0  0:4 0:2
Curr. Acc. balance 274  3:1  3:2 5:9  31:2 20:1
Financial risk measures:
Foreign debt 285 0:6 0:7 0:6 0:1 7:0
For. debt service 270 18:8 19:7 13:5 1:3 84:5
Curr. Acc. to exports 274  0:1  0:2 0:3  1:6 0:4
Reserves to imp. months 268 3:3 3:8 3:1 0:1 26:0
Exch. R. stab. 289 0:1 0:2 0:4  1:7 2:8
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